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The purpose of this thesis was to characterize the current
Congressional climate for Naval Aviation budget requests.
An objective approach, consisting of the measurement of
three key indicators of Congressional behavior during the
authorization phases of the FY 1978, FY 1979 and FY 1980
budget cycles, was employed. These indicators were: (1) the
questions asked of defense witnesses during the Hearings,
(2) the funding adjustments recommended and (3) the rationale
provided for committee decisions. Examination of the first
indicator led to the development of a research typology
that used the technique of content analysis of the authori-
zation hearings to measure Congressional attempts at micro-
management. Measurement of the latter two indicators employed
techniques developed and commonly used by earlier researchers.
The same three indicators were measured for comparable Air
Force Tactical Aviation programs to provide a basis for
comparison.
Several dimensions of the Congressional climate were
analyzed, however the major conclusion reached was that
Naval Aviation programs have been subjected to less micro-
management and have received larger budget increases than
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The relationship between the Congress and the Executive
Branch has been characterized by Arthur Schlesinger as,
"one of the abiding mysteries of the American system of
government." In developing this thought, Schlesigner
further contends that the complexity surrounding this
relationship has not come about by chance — or by mistake.
The founding fathers, in drafting the Constitution, purposely
provided only a general framework and not a specific defini-
tion of the intended relations between the Congress and
the President. Their intention being to let time and experi-
ence mold the relationship as most appropriate to fit the
needs of our country [Ref. 25]. This position, portraying
an imprecise and incomplete definition of responsibilities,
runs directly counter to the text book descriptions of the
Constitutional separation of powers. But in truth, our govern-
ment actually does operate, not as a government of separated
powers, but, as described by Richard Neustadt, "as a govern-
ment of separated institutions sharing powers."
At no time is the relationship between the Congress and
the Executive Branch less clear than during the process of
determining the optimum allocation of our defense resources.
The Constitutional intent of establishing Congress as "keeper




No money shall be drawn from the Treasury,
but in Consequence of Appropriations made
by Law; the Congress shall have power to
raise and support Armies.
However, the ensuing process, described by Schlesinger, of
time and experience molding these general provisions into
a set of working relationships has been far from smooth and
orderly. Real control of the defense budgetary process
has been a hotly contested issue since the time of the
very first Federal budgets developed by Alexander Hamilton.
At various times throughout our history, there have been
dramatic shifts in budgetary control, back and forth between
the Congress and the Executive Branch. Many students of this
process feel that such a shift is presently taking place
with the Congress making a partially successful attempt at
regaining some of the power relinquished to a strong Execu-
tive during the 1960 's and early 1970' s [Ref. 18].
In an environment as described above, it would seem
axiomatic that an Executive agency whose very life blood,
its budget, requires substantial Congressional authoriza-
tion must extend every possible effort to understand the
relationships at work. The recognition of the complexity
and importance of this problem initially focused this
researcher's attention in this area. Coupled with a back-
ground as an employee of the Department of the Navy, an
agency of the nature just described, this recognition led to
a desire to provide an improved understanding of the Navy's
relationship with Congress. A specific interest in the
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management of Naval Aviation weapon system programs then
resulted in the foundation of the following detailed
objective for this research study effort -- to characterize
the current Congressional budgetary climate for Naval Avia-
tion. In this study, the term "budgetary climate" is intended
to encompass the overall treatment accorded the Navy's
budget in Congress, culminating in the changes actually
made to the requested budget.
B. THE APPROACH
Previous studies in this area have tended to concentrate
on examining the general relationship between Congress and
the Executive and have been most interested in trying to
define the motivations behind Congressional decision-making.
The research approaches most often employed have been the
detailed study of a specific case over time or the subjec-
tive interview and survey question technique.
The primary interest in this study, however, is not to
investigate Congressional motivations, but rather to examine
the results of the Navy's interactions with Congress during
the budgetary process. The approach selected for this
effort is a simple, more analytical effort aimed at measuring
key indicators of Congressional influence on the Navy's bud-
get. In order to provide some perspective for viewing the
results of these measurements, the same key indicators will
also be measured for Air Force Tactical weapon system pro-
grams considered comparable to the Naval Aviation programs.
11

The results thus obtained will then be analyzed and com-
pared with the objective of providing a description of the
current Congressional climate for Naval Aviation programs.
For reasons discussed in Chapter III, this study will
be confined to the authorization phases of the budgets
for Fiscal Year (FY) 1978, FY 1979 and FY 1980. The indi-
cators of Congressional behavior selected for measurement
were
:
(1) the questions asked of defense witnesses
during the Hearings
(2) the funding adjustments recommended by
the committees
(3) the rationale provided for committee decisions
Again as described in Chapter III, this study will be limited
to consideration of the Procurement and Research, Develop-
ment, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) appropriation categories
only.
C. ORGANIZATION OF THIS REPORT
The chapter immediately following provides background
information describing the approach selected and the results
obtained in this study. Chapter III defines the approach
followed in analyzing the three previously cited key indi-
cators of Congressional behavior. This is followed by a
presentation of the most significant findings in Chapter IV.
Chapter V reviews these findings and provides the conclusions.
Several appendices with sample worksheets, research formats




The sections to follow in this chapter are intended to
provide the reader with sufficient background knowledge to
understand the focus of this study and to appreciate the
complexity of the relationship between Congress and the
Executive Branch. The first section will very briefly out-
line the role established for the Congress in the Constitu-
tion as the "keeper of the purse." The second section will
then summarize the circumstances and events surrounding those
times in our history when control of the budgetary process
has transferred between the Congress and the Executive. The
final section of this chapter will provide a description of
the current relationship between Congress and the Executive.
This will be accomplished by reviewing those recent research
efforts whose approaches and results most influenced the
directions taken in this study.
A. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGETARY ROLE AS ESTABLISHED BY THE
CONSTITUTION
The functions and responsibilities of Congress have been
grouped in many different categories by various students of
the political system. Most would agree, however, that all
of the primary Congressional functions are in some way
included in the following:
(1) Making of laws
(.2) Checking on the administration
13

(3) Informing the public
(4) Representing constituent interests
This study, with its stated objective of describing the
budgetary climate for the Navy, will focus on the first of
these functions -- the creation of legislation. Specifically,
because of this budgetary orientation, the funds authori-
zation legislative process will receive concentrated
attention.
It should be noted here that the budget process often
plays an important part in Congress' execution of its respon-
sibilities in its other functions — particularly when over-
seeing the administration and representing constituent inter-
ests. This creates a set of interesting implications which
will be addressed in the following chapter.
The responsibility of Congress in the budgetary process,
often referred to as the "power of the purse," is clearly
established in Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution as
follows
:
The Congress shall have Power to lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises,
to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defense and general Welfare of the United
States
;
Congressional responsibility in the area of the Defense bud-
get, in particular, is further defined later in this same
section of the Constitution by the following:
[The Congress shall have power]
To raise and support Armies, but no Appro-
priation of Money to that Use shall be
for a longer Term than two years;
14

To provide and maintain a Navy;
To make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval forces;
Undoubtedly, the framers of our Constitution modeled this
assignment of Congressional spending power after the experi-
ence of the English Parliament. The Parliament secured its
authority over the spending power because of the nature of
the responsibilities of the legislative branch of the Govern-
ment. The legislator, as a direct representative of the
people, naturally would protect the interests of those he
represented and in particular, he would be very much con-
cerned with the level of taxation. It is interesting to
note that even though the writing of the Constitution
created significant new powers for the Executive and signaled
the end of the legislative government originally created
by the Articles of Confederation, the "power of the purse"
remained securely with the Congress.
B. THE CHANGING ROLE OF CONGRESS IN THE BUDGETARY PROCESS
At the time of the writing of the Constitution, this
assignment of the "power of the purse" responsibility to
Congress was considered a major delegation of power. In
the Federalist Papers, The Federalist No. 53, Alexander
Hamilton predicted:
This power over the purse may, in fact, be
regarded as the most complere and effectual
weapon with which any constitution can arm
the immediate representatives of the
people. [Ref. 12, p. 3]
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Despite the potential for power associated with this
assignment of responsibility, effective utilization of
this power through actual control of the budget process,
did not occur automatically for Congress. As will be evi-
dent from the brief review of budget history to follow,
real control of the budgetary process has made periodic
fluctuations between the Congress and the Executive branch.
This review, highlighting only the most significant events,
will provide a perspective which will prove helpful in
understanding the current budgeting activities.
The first Federal budgets were developed, starting in
1789, by the Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton.
Hamilton believed that the Executive Branch should control
the process of determining which of the competing needs
within the country would receive the funds. His system
of four broadly-based appropriations in the entire budget
gave the Executive a great deal of latitude - the kind of
latitude modern-day managers in DoD can only dream about.
Within a few years, Congress established a Ways and
Means Committee to review Hamilton's budgets in more detail.
Soon thereafter, Hamilton began to receive a number of Con-
gressional demands for information to substantiate his bud-
get requests. As if to set the tone for Executive/Congressional
budgetary relations for the next 2 00-year period, Hamilton
provided the required information, but continued to transfer
funds, as he deemed necessary, between line items without
Congressional approval [Ref. 4, p. 12].
16

Later strengthening of the Ways and Means Committee and
establishment of the Military and Naval Affairs Committees
(later to become the Armed Services Committees) provided the
Congress with general control of the defense budgets during
most of the 1800' s and the early 1900* s. Probably just as
important during this time was the fact that there was no
central driving force for financial planning within the
Executive. Also the War and Navy Departments were not at
all prepared or equipped to play budgetary decision-making
roles. Congress exhibited their control and interest in
detailed financial planning by vastly increasing the number
of appropriation line items. For example, in the 1878
budget, the appropriation for the U.S. Military Academy
totaled approximately $200,000 and was made up of some 40
line items as detailed as the following:
For Department of Artillery, Cavalry and Infantry
Tactics, namely [Ref. 7, p. 2 as cited in Ref. 22,
p. 6]
(1) Tan-bark, for riding hall and gymnasium - $300.
(2) Repairing camp stools and tents - $50.
(3) Stationary for use of instructors - $100.
(4) Text books - $20.
Starting in the early 1900' s, the Executive Branch began
to become more interested and capable of participating in
the budget process. Probably as important as this emergence
of interest within the Executive Branch, was the complete
decentralization of the Congressional appropriation process.
17

Eighteen committees had the power to recommend appropria-
tions, but no one looked at the allocation as a whole.
This was viewed as a significant problem by many within
Congress as well as many within the growing Executive
Departments. The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 was
enacted as an attempt to correct this situation.
One of the key provisions of the 1921 Act provided for
the President to formulate and present a comprehensive
executive budget to the Congress. Another important pro-
vision of this Act established the Bureau of the Budget
(later to become the Office of Management and Budget) to
assist the President with his new tasks. Although little
impact was immediately evidenced from these changes, this
legislation did mark a significant turning point and the
beginning of a definite shift in power toward the Executive
Branch.
During the next 40 years, Congress periodically produced
legislative measures aimed at regaining some of the control
over the budgetary process that they had previously enjoyed.
These efforts were largely unsuccessful and the power of
the purse increasingly shifted toward the President and his
staffs. With the coming of the McNamara-guided Department
of Defense (DoD) in the 1960 l s, there is little question of
who controlled the allocation of defense resources. The
1960's undoubtedly marked the high point of Executive influ-




C. CURRENT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONGRESS AND DOD
In order to complete this brief background of Congresional/
Executive relations, the section to follow will summarize
the current situation by describing some of the most signi-
ficant, recent research efforts and publications in this
area. The purpose here is not to attempt to provide a
comprehensive review of the available literature , but rather
to cite those particular efforts that most influenced the
design and conduct of this study.
One interesting area of research is centered on the
question of whether Congress makes its decision from an
incremental, fiscal basis or from a broader based, policy-
making or programmatic viewpoint. This question has grown
out of a number of research efforts conducted/published
in the 1960 's including:
(1) Huntington's description of defense policy
issues as "structural" or "srraregic" [Ref. 14].
(2) Fenno ' s findings that non-defense agencies
were primarily concerned with programmatic
issues while related Congressional decisions
were made more on a fiscal basis [Ref. 8]
.
(3) Wildavsky ' s findings that the non-defense
committees of Congress processed their portions
of the budget in an incremental, fiscal approach
with little concern to the ultimate desire-
ability of the program [Ref. 41].
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Kanter used the foregoing as a starting point to study
Congress's processing of the defense budget from 1960 to
1970 [Ref. 16]. He found that while Congressional treatment
of the DoD budget from a whole was incremental, when dis-
aggregated into its appropriation categories, the budget was
reviewed with more of a programmatic orientation. Kanter
concluded that at the budget category level, Congress was
indeed interested in influencing defense policy and in helping
to determine the shape of the programs. Korb followed Kanter'
s
work with a study of the Congressional influence on the
major appropriation categories of DoD's budget from 1962
to 1973 [Ref. 17]. His findings contradicted those of Kanter
as he concluded that the programmatic adjustments did not
truly shape programs since the original program was just
restored in later years.
These works, in turn, inspired several research efforts
at the Naval Postgraduate School that used the content analy-
sis technique to analyze committee reports for indications
of fiscal or programmatic decision-making. Lukenas inves-
tigated the House Appropriations Committee decisions and
found that during the 1970 through 1973 budget cycles, most
of this committee's decisions were fiscal in nature [Ref. 20].
From a study of the decisions made by the Senate Armed Ser-
vices Committee on the FY 1968 through FY 1974 budgets,
Blackmon concluded that while the Committee made a majority
of its decisions on a fiscal basis, programmatic decision-
making was becoming increasingly important [Ref. 3] . Camp
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used the content analysis technique to study the decisions
made by both the House and Senate Armed Services and
Appropriations Committees on the FY 76 and FY 77 budgets,
the first two years to be affected by the Congressional
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 [Ref. 4]. He
found that the trend of increasing programmatic decision-
making had continued and that the committees, taken as a
unit, made a majority of their decisions from a programmatic
basis
.
This line of research influenced this researcher to
include in this study an analysis of the fiscal/programmatic
behavior of the authorization committees in the FY 73, FY
79 and FY 80 budgets. This provided one key measure for
comparing the Congressional treatment of Navy and Air Force
programs
.
A second line of existing research that influenced the
design of this study evolved from Laurance ' s article that
suggested a systemic approach for studying the changing role
of Congress in defense policy [Ref. 13]. The suggested
system was built on a set on inputs, the conversion of these
inputs by certain internal processes and a group of measur-
able outputs or impacts on the external system. Through a
review of various studies that measured several of these
key indicators, Laurance concluded that Congress was increasingly
assuming a policy making role in the defense budget process.
This conclusion suggested the need for an updating to reflect
the current situation. This work and the efforts of
21

Sharkansky in evaluating the relationship between a House
Appropriations Subcommittee and four of its client agencies
[Ref. 26] resulted in the decision to include in this study
an analysis of the questions asked of defense witnesses
during the budget Hearings. In Laurance ' s terms, these
Hearing questions are one of the important inputs into the
budgetary process. Laurance 's article also suggested the
measurement of one of the important conversion processes --
i.e., the actual budget adjustments recommended by the
committees
.
A final area of interest that shaped the approach taken
in this study is represented by numerous recent articles
concerned with the increase of Congressional micromanagement
of the defense agencies [Refs. 1, 11, 19, 21 and 24]. Most
of these articles argue from DoD ' s viewpoint that Congress
is wasting its time and energies making program decisions
and involving itself in program details that rightfully
belong to DoD. The allegation is that this occurs while
problems more suited for Congressional involvement are
ignored. The Congressional reply to this criticism has
generally been that the micromanagement should be viewed as
assistance and is only applied when necessary — i.e., when
the DoD management has been inadequate [Refs. 5 and 15].
The articles on both sides of this issue have generally
been based on non-analytical arguments. Case studies have
also been used to show the degree that Congress has become
involved with certain weapon system programs over time.
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Again these studies have generally been subjective in
nature with emphasis on the personal interview technique
[Ref . 22]
.
The focus of this literature on the micromanagement
issue and the previous studies indicating an increasing
Congressional interest in shaping defense policy influenced
the decision to investigate micromanagement in this study.
As described in Chapter III, a typology was devised that
was designed to measure the degree of micromanagement
existing in questions asked during authorization hearings.
This typology was then used to measure the degree of micro-
management contained in the Hearings before two authoriza-
tion sub-committees reviewing the FY 7 8 and FY 7 9 budgets.
This provided another measure for comparing the treatment
of Navy and Air Force programs. When combined with the
previously described measures — the fiscal/programmatic
decision making analysis and the recommended funding adjust-
ments — a means had finally been devised for describing the
overall Congressional climate for Naval Aviation programs.
23

III. APPROACH TO ANALYSIS
A. GENERAL APPROACH AND LIMITATIONS
As was established in the introductory chapter, the
primary purpose of this thesis is to characterize the cur-
rent budgetary climate for Naval Aviation programs within
Congress. Naval Aviation programs were selected because
of the researcher's work background and interest. To
provide a benchmark for understanding the Congressional
climate, it was decided to compare all findings for Naval
Aviation programs with the treatment accorded similar Air
Force Tactical Aviation programs. The general technique
selected to provide this characterization was to measure
three key indicators involved in the authorization portion
of the Congressional budget process. These indicators were:
(1) the questions asked of defense witnesses during the
authorization hearings, (2) the actual level of funding
adjustments recommended by the authorization committees,
and (3) the reasons given for these committee recommendations
This approach created the need for the introduction of
several limitations and simplifying assumptions. The first
of these was the consideration of only those programs within
the Air Force budget that were comparable to Naval Aviation
programs from the standpoint of mission area or objective.
This limitation will be described in more detail as each
measurement indicator is analyzed in the sections to follow,
24

In general, however, this limitation resulted in ignoring
strategic Air Force programs and any joint service programs
where the value of the indicator being measured could not
be assigned specifically to either service.
The authorization portion of the Congressional budgetary
process was selected for this study because a review of the
existing literature indicates that most researchers feel
that the military authorizing committees have the greatest
potential for influencing defense programs and policy [Ref. 3,
p. 16] . Other researchers would disagree with this position
and particularly in the area of non-defense matters, would
support the position that the Appropriations Committees are
the most influential and powerful Congressional participants
in the budgetary process [Ref. 8, p. 1 as cited in Ref. 20,
p. 3]. However, it is generally conceded that such changes
to the budget process as the reporting deadline dates and
the compressed hearing schedules introduced by the 197 4
Impoundment Control Act have tended to make the authorizing
legislation the primary vehicle for shaping defense policy
and for overseeing DoD [Ref. 39, p. 50].
The sections of the Defense Budget selected for this
analysis were the budget categories Title I, Procurement
and Title II, Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
(RDT&E) . This decision was based on the findings of both
Kanter and Korb who concluded that Congress concentrates its
energies in the Procurement and RDT&E areas for one or mere
of the following reasons [Ref. 16, pp. 134-136, and Ref. 17, p. 60]
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(1) Congress tries to cope with the complexity of
the budget request by concentrating on the
changes made from the previous year ' s budget and
typically, most changes are made in the Procurement
and RDT&E categories.
(2) Congress can best apply its alleged incremental
budget review philosophy to these categories
because they can most easily be disaggregated
into individual programs.
(3) Procurement and RDT&E budget requests form the
heart of national security and in trying to shape
defense policy, Congress may purposely select
these categories for their attention.
(4) The Procurement and RDT&E categories may offer the
most politically expedient areas in which changes
can be made. Personnel removed from the payroll
directly affect voting constituencies and closed
bases and facilities seldom re-open.
Whatever reasons Congress has for emphasizing the Procurement
and RDT&E budget categories, it was apparent that this study
of Congressional/Executive relations should itself be con-
centrated in this area. ,
The final general limitation imposed on this study was
the consideration of only the FY 1978, FY 1979 and FY 1980
Budgets. This limitation resulted from a desire to charac-
terize the current Congressional climate rather than to
26

'investigate trends. The deficiency of this approach is
that it provides a "snap shot" in time only, with results
that are highly susceptible to obsolescence. This obsoles-
cence can occur very easily as a result of changes in key
personnel involved in the process, general economic condi-
tions and the world political situation. Nevertheless,
the results do have some continuing validity despite the
concentration in three fiscal years and can serve as a
point of comparison for future analyses.
The following sections will describe the specific
analytical approaches that were followed for measurement
of each of the three selected indicators.
B. HEARING QUESTIONS
1. Methodology
The questions asked of USN and USAF witnesses during
the Authorization Hearings before both the House Armed Ser-
vices Committee (HASC) and the Senate Armed Services Committee
(SASC) provided the data for the first key indicator to be
measured in this study. To investigate the DoD ' s allega-
tions of increasing Congressional micromanagement , it was
decided to first record and compare the frequency of ques-
tions in certain subject areas for the Navy and Air Force.
In keeping with the general approach established in the pre^
vious section, only Naval Aviation and comparable Air Force
Tactical Air weapon system programs were analyzed. This
led to the use of the following source documents for this




a. HASC Hearings on Military Posture, Part 2,
Procurement of Aircraft, Missiles, etc. - Title
I [Ref. 27 for FY 78 and Ref. 28 for FY 79].
b. SASC Hearings, Parts 6 and 7 before the TACAIR
Subcommittee [Ref. 33 for FY 78 and Ref. 3 4
for FY 79]
.
The questions included in this part of the analysis
were limited to the FY 1978 and FY 1979 Budget Hearings because
the corresponding source documents for the FY 1980 Hearings
were not available at the time of this report. Normally,
the printed Hearing documents become available in subscriber
libraries in the mid-June to mid-July timeframe. This,
unfortunately, was not the case for the FY 198 Hearings.
The working definition of a "question" utilized for
this study corresponded to Sharkansky's concept of any unit
of discourse that included one distinct inquiry [Ref. 26,
p. 624]. In addition, statements not formulated or punctua-
ted as questions were considered to be "questions" if they
elicited replies from the witnesses.
Typically, the primary witnesses for each service
made formal presentations of all their programs in the
Tactical Aviation mission area and then each weapon system
program in turn, was presented in more detail. For the
programs considered here, the primary service witness was
generally at the Deputy Chief of Staff level for the Air
Force and at the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations level for
28

the Navy. Questions were usually asked by the committee
members and the staffs during and immediately following each
individual program presentation. However, particularly on
controversial issues, questions on certain programs were
sprinkled throughout the Hearings. All of these questions
were included in this analysis, as were those questions that
only requested written replies for the record.
2 . Development of the Analytical Framework
The first step taken in developing the framework for
use in this portion of the study was to record every question
asked on three randomly selected USAF programs and three
randomly selected USN programs during both the FY 1978
and FY 1979 Hearings. This involved a total of some 630
questions. These questions were studied for subject matter
and eventually classified into the following five subject
categories
:
a. Cost/Funding — Questions included in this cate-
gory dealt with the program funding structure,
cost of the weapon system, cost effectiveness,
cost of a particular modification or subprogram,
cost control measures and service funding levels.
b. Force Structure — This subject category was
defined by all those questions dealing with the
inventory of a particular system, the inventory
requirements, population or inventory interfaces
29

between systems and the mix of the total
force
.
c. Design/Performance — This category was made up
of all questions concerned with the design and
performance characteristics of the weapon sys-
tems or their components. Inquiries into the
techniques for operational employment and the
capability of meeting mission requirements were
also included in this category.
d. Program Management -- Inquiries involving the
manner in which the program was being directed,
how the decisions were being made, the test
results, the status of the program, the possi-
bility of multi-service cooperation and the
relationship to Congressional direction con-
stituted the development of this category.
e. Other — Any questions not falling into the
already established categories. (This, at
first, may appear to be too broad a category to
allow for a meaningful analysis, but in fact,
fewer than 5% of the questions were placed in
this category.)
The second step of this process of developing an
analytical framework involved physically arranging all of
the questions in each subject category in relative order
with respect to the variable — "level of detail." This
variable was selected after a careful study of the main
30

themes of concern of each question and after a detailed
review of the available literature providing DoD ' s des-
criptions of Congressional micromanagement [Refs. 1, 5, 11,
19, 21 and 24] . This "level of detail" variable emerged
from this review as the best measurable representation of
the concept of micromanagement. As an example of the pro-
cess employed in this step, the ordered list of questions
that was developed for the Program Management subject cate-
gory is attached as Appendix A. This list starts with the
most detailed or specific management question and extends
to the most general or overview type of question that was
asked. Similar lists were developed for each subject cate-
gory.
Not every question that was recorded in the Program
Management category is included in Appendix A for reasons
of space in this report. However, all "levels of detail"
that were identified in this category are represented. That
effort constituted the third step in developing the analy-
tical framework. To create a workable typology, various
distinct "levels of detail" existing in each ordered list
of questions were identified and representative questions,
typical of each level, were developed. The identified "levels
of detail" and the corresponding "typical questions" are
included in Appendix B for the four main subject categories.




The final step in developing this framework for
analysis required the identification of the "levels of
detail" considered to represent Congressional micromanage-
ment of the defense budget. Again, after study of the now
developed "typical questions" and the existing literature
describing the Defense Department's concept of micromanage-
ment, the following working definition was formulated:
a. All questions in the subject categories of
Cost/Funding and Force Structure fall within
Congress's area of responsibility, regardless
of their "level of detail," and thus, for this
study were considered to not be micromanagement
.
b. Questions in the Design/Performance category
identified in the Appendix B "levels of detail"
lists as being in Levels I-III were considered
to represent micromanagement. Answers to these
questions were assessed as not required for
Congress to fulfill its responsibilities in the
budget process. The "typical questions" of
these levels included: Why don't you design it
like this? What is the particular design problem?
How much fuel does it carry? How fast can it fly?
How is the system employed in the operational
environment?
c. Design/Performance questions at Levels IV and V
were considered to not be micromanagement.
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d. Program Management questions in Levels I-IV were
considered representative of Congressional micro-
management. The "typical questions" of these
levels included: Shouldn't the program be
managed this way? Will you have competition?
Why are these components being procured as Con-
tractor Furnished Equipment instead of Government
Furnished? Who in DoD made this decision? Will
you have a DSARC? Have you properly planned
for the support elements of the program? What
are the results of this test? (See Appendix B
for the remaining "typical questions.")
e. Program Management questions at Levels V-X were
considered to not be micromanagement
.
f. All questions in the Other category were considered
to not be micromanagement.
Thus, the working definition for questions representing
Congressional micromanagement of the defense budget became:
MICROMANAGEMENT NOT MICROMANAGEMENT
Design/Performance — Levels I-III All Cost/Funding and Force
Structure
Program Management — Levels I-IV Design/Performance — Levels
IV and V
Program Management — Levels
V through X
All Other
As was discussed in the Background Chapter, Congress
has responsibility for a number of functions in addition to
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the authorization of budget legislation task that is of
primary importance to this study. Further, it was indi-
cated that at times, Congress used the occasion of budge-
tary decisions to act as overseer of the administration and
as representative of constituent interests. Considering
the preceding definition of micromanagement , one realizes
that questions that would be considered to be inappropriate
micromanagement when asked from the budgetary standpoint,
might be totally appropriate for a Congressman performing in
his other capacities. In fact, this attention to detail,
i.e., micromanagement, may be the only effective means
available for a Congressman to fulfill his oversight and
representative responsibilities.
In reviewing the questions asked of DoD witnesses
•
in this light, it appears quite likely that Congressmen
asking questions delving into the details of the management
of a program, may very well be doing so with the intention
of checking administrative compliance with legislative
guidance. Likewise, the Congressman asking detailed ques-
tions concerning the design characteristics of a system may
actually be attempting to protect the interests of a con-
tractor from his home district. Whatever may have motivated
the Congressman to ask these questions during the Hearings,
the result or impact on the service is micromanagement. Since,
as previously stipulated, this study is most interested in
describing the results of the Navy's interactions with Congress,
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the above working definition of micromanagement was employed
without further consideration of Congressional motivations.
With this, the framework for analysis was considered
completed and the emphasis was then applied to using this
technique to analyze the questions asked during the Hearings.
3. The Analysis
Using the framework described in the preceding section
and the source documents listed in Section 1. Methodology
,
all questions asked in the FY 1978 and FY 1979 Hearings on
Tactical Aviation weapon system programs were analyzed and
categorized. Inspection of a sample worksheet, included in
this report as Appendix C, will make the mechanics of this
process obvious. A grand total of some 3,100 questions were
analyzed and categorized in this manner. The results of this
effort are discussed in detail in Chapter IV of this report.
C. FUNDING ADJUSTMENTS
1. Methodology
The second indicator, analyzed as part of this effort
to characterize the overall Congressional climate for Naval
Aviation programs, was based on the HASC and SASC recommended
funding adjustments to DoD's budget requests of FY's 1978,
1979 and 1980. The basic source documents for this informa-
tion were the House and Senate Armed Services Committee Reports
on the Department of Defense Authorization Act for the





As established in Section A, GENERAL APPROACH of
this Chapter, only the adjustments to the Procurement and
RDT&E budget categories and only USN and USAF weapon system
programs in the Tactical Aviation mission areas were con-
sidered in this analysis. In certain limited instances,
it was impossible to determine, with the information avail-
able, the exact level of the DoD requests. This was particu-
larly true in those areas where the budget request for a
common line item, e.g., RDT&E Aircraft Flight Test Support,
was spread across several weapon system programs. In all
cases, it was attempted to assign all costs associated with
a program to that particular program. Information received
from telephone conversations with the Naval Air Systems
Command Comptroller were of great assistance in this area.
2 . The Analysis
Initially, the funding adjustments were calculated
and recorded by: (1) budget category, (2) service, (3) fiscal
year and (4) by House of Congress making the adjustment.
These adjustments were then totaled and displayed in various
ways to aid in the analysis.
The adjustments themselves were also calculated in
two different ways. First, the NET CHANGE to the DoD bud-
get request (positive or negative) was calculated. The
NET CHANGE as a percentage of the original request was also
calculated. The second category of adjustment to be calcu-
lated and recorded was the ABSOLUTE CHANGE to the budget
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request, i.e., the additions and subtractions taken together.
This ABSOLUTE CHANGE then was calculated as a percentage of
the original request to provide the mean absolute difference
measure described by Korb [Ref. 17, p. 56].
The ABSOLUTE CHANGE measure was considered to be
the better indicator of total Congressional involvement or
activity in the budget process, whereas the NET CHANGE
indicated the Congressional value placed on the particular
programs undergoing consideration. Both of these measures
are presented in detail in Chapter IV of this report.
D. REASONS GIVEN FOR COMMITTEE DECISIONS
1. Methodology
The third and final indicator selected for analysis
in this study involved the reasons given by the HASC and
SASC for making their recommended program funding adjustments
The dimension chosen to be measured was the Congressional
decision-making hypothesis — "fiscal" versus "programmatic"
which has been the subject of several other studies as des-
cribed in Chapter II. In particular, the works of Blackmon
[Ref. 3] and Camp [Ref. 4] were used to guide the analytical
methodology of categorizing the reasons given for committee
decisions as either being "fiscal" or "programmatic" in
nature
.
The research technique of content analysis was
employed here to classify each committee decision based on
the success of this method in these earlier studies, and
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particularly because of Sharkansky ' s finding that it was
a valid tool to devise indexes of committee behavior toward
their client agencies [Ref. 26, p. 628]. Category defini-
tion, which is critical to the validity of the content
analysis technique, was based heavily on the efforts of
Camp [Ref. 4]. With some small exceptions, the categories
used in this study were identical to the categories devised,
tested and validated by Camp [Ref. 4, pp. 48-54]. The
categories used follow:
a. Fiscal Category
Committee decisions placed in this category
were those primarily concerned with the level of Defense
spending not overall Defense policy or program composition.
Actions in this category were focused on eliminating per-
ceived waste or inefficiency and were evidenced by percen-
tage cuts or "across-the-board" reductions.
(1) Cost
This sub-category included the committee
decisions concerned with cost effectiveness, cost growth,
cost overruns and expenditures.
(2) Improper Request
Committee concerns over the need for the
funds at the time or in the particular appropriation requested
were reflected in this sub-category.
(3) Program Management
Decisions that cited cost inefficiencies
and waste associated with the way the program or procurement




Decisions reflecting the committee's interest
in addressing the budget in policy terms with the intent
of influencing the shape or composition of the programs
appeared in this category. These decisions demonstrated
less committee concern with total spending and more concern
with the adequacy of the defense posture, the make-up of
the force, the type of hardware being procured and the
management of the program.
(1) Force Structure
This subcategory included the committee
decisions that involved the level and composition of the
force, the inventory of a certain system and its readiness
and effectiveness.
(2) Force Modernization
Committee decisions involving the replace-
ment of obsolete systems were placed in this category.
(3) Developmental
Decisions dealing with scheduling, testing,
technical problems and program slippages made up this
category.
(4) Planning/Justification
In this category were placed the committee
decisions that questioned the justification of the need for





This category contained all decisions that
cited compliance with Congressional directive or policy as
the driving factor.
c. Other Category
When the decision did not fall into any of the
foregoing categories or in those cases where it was impossi-
ble to determine the reason or the committee's intentions,
the decision was included in this category. Most decisions
were able to be placed in either a "Fiscal" or "Programmatic"
category — less than 5% had to be included in this "Other"
category
.
Again, conforming with the GENERAL APPROACH
section of this Chapter, only those committee decisions that:
(1) dealt with USN and USAF weapon system programs in the
Tactical Aviation mission area, and (2) were within the
Procurement and RDT&E budget categories were considered.
The source documents for the committee decisions were the
House and Senate Armed Services Committee Reports on the
Department of Defense Authorization Act [Refs. 2 9 through
31 and Refs. 3 5 through 37] . The budgets analyzed were
for FY's 1978, 1979 and 1980.
2. The Analysis
The first step in this process was to record each
committee decision of interest on worksheets. A sample
worksheet is included in this report as Appendix D. These
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worksheets were separated initially by budget category
(Procurement or RDT&E) , by committee (HASC or SASC) , by
fiscal year (FY 78, FY 79 or FY 80) and by service (USN
or USAF) . A total of 186 decisions were recorded in this
manner.
The next step in the analysis was to review each
of the committee decisions in great detail, note key words
and phrases, and categorize it into one of the sub-categories
defined in the previous section. Finally, all decisions
were coded into the proper major category — i.e., "Fiscal,"
"Programmatic" or "Other" — as defined in the previous




IV. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
The results of the analyses conducted as described in
Chapter III will be summarized in the sections to follow.
The results of each major indicator measured will be re-
ported separately, while the relationships between these
indicators will be discussed in Chapter V, CONCLUSIONS.
A. HEARING QUESTIONS
As described in the previous chapter, the intent of this
first indicator was to categorize, by subject, the questions
asked of USN and USAF witnesses during the budget hearings.
The subject categories devised were: 1) Funding/Cost, 2) Force
Structure, (3) Design/Performance, 4) Program Management
and 5) Other. The categories of Design/Performance and
Program Management were further sub-divided based upon the
"level of detail" contained in the inquiry. The lower levels
or more detailed inquiries were taken to represent efforts
at Congressional micromanagement of the defense budget. The
FY 1978 and FY 1979 Hearings before the Tactical Air Sub-
committee of the SASC and before the full HASC provided the
subject matter for this analysis. All questions asked
regarding USN and USAF weapon system programs in the Tacti-
cal Aviation Mission area were categorized and the results
recorded by service, by fiscal year and by the committee
asking the question. The overall results obtained from this
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effort are shown in the Tables that follow — Table I for
the questions asked of the Navy and Table II for the Air
Force.
USN QUESTIONS










Funding/Cost 92 51 89 59 291








































Funding/Cost 111 145 76 45
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In percentage terms and ignoring (for the moment]
the differences between committees, this data appears as




% of Total Questions Asked in Each Fiscal Year
Subject Category FY 1978 FY 1979 Average
Funding/Cost 15% 21% 18%
Force Structure 15% 16% 15%
Design/Performance
- Micromgt. 12% 12% 12%
- Non Micromgt. 18% 20% 19%
Program Mgt.
- Micromgt. 17% 11% 15%
- Non Micromgt. 19% 17% 18%
Other 4% 3% 3%
Total 100% 100% 100%
Table III
USAF QUESTIONS
% of Total Questions Asked in Each Fiscal Year
Table IV
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Subject Category FY 1978 FY 1979 Average
Funding/Cost 26% 23% 25%
Force Structure 3% 4% 4%
Design/Performance
- Micromgt. 20% 18% 19%
- Non Micromgt. 17% 16% 17%
Program Mgt.
- Micromgt. 11% 15% 12%
-< Non Micromgt. 19% 22% 20%
Other 4% 2% 3%
Total 100% 100% 100%

Inspection of these results provides a number of inter-
esting findings including:
1. The questions asked of both services were remarkably
consistent from the FY 1978 Hearings to the FY 1979 Hearings.
2. The largest changes from one year to the next
occurred for both services in the "Funding/Cost" category
and in the "MICRO management" level of the "Program Manage-
ment" category. The percentage of "Funding/Cost" questions
increased for the Navy and decreased for the Air Force from
FY 78 to FY 79. This trend was just reversed for "MICRO"
questions in the "Program Management" category.
3. Ignoring the "MICRO management" subdivisions, the
greatest percentage of questions to both services were in
the "Design/Performance" and "Program Management" categories
.
4. The Air Force was asked more questions than the
Navy in the "Funding/Cost" category with the reverse occurring
in the "Force Structure" category.
Ignoring again the "MICRO management" subdivisions, these
results for subject category classification are best shown
by the following Figure 1.
46













'J. <i 2 <.
\r> oO VI «/>
o O O
*»<•»<»/ foftce Dcsi^*/ ?eofc









In Chapter III, a working definition or representation
of Congressional micromanagement of the defense budget was
developed as the "high level of detail" questions asked in
the two subject categories — "Design/Performance" and
"Program Management." Manipulation of the foregoing data
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Figure 2
It is evident that in both, years included in this portion
of the study, a higher percentage of the questions asked of
the Air Force fit the micromanagement definition. This was
especially true in FY 1979 when 33% of the total questions
asked of the Air Force, as compared to 23% for the Navy,
were categorized as micromanagement. From FY 197 8 to FY 1979
the micromanagement percentage decreased significantly for
the Navy and increased slightly for the Air Force.
Up to this point, the influence of the committee asking
the question has been largely disregarded. If the results
obtained from the two fiscal year budgets are combined, the
subject category breakdowns (in percentage terms) by committee




% of Total Questions Asked By Each Committee
Subject Category SASC HASC
Funding/Cost 19% 16%
Force Structure 19% 10%
Design/Performance
- Micromgt. 13% 9%
- Non Micromgt. 21% 15%
Program Mgt.
- Micromgt. 10% 21%





% of Total Questions Asked 3y Each Committee
Subject Category SASC HASC
Funding/Cost 21% 31%
Force Structure 4% 3%
Design/Performance
- Micromgt. 22% 16%
- Non Micromgt. 18% 15%
..... .
Program Mgt.
- Micromgt. 12% 12%








Table V indicates that the SASC TACAIR Subcommittee
asked the Navy a higher percentage of questions in the
"Funding/Cost," "Force Structure" and "Design/Performance"
subject categories than the full HASC did. This situation
was reversed with questions in the "Program Management"
category. When questioning the Air Force, the SASC again
asked a higher percentage of questions in the Design/
Performance category than the HASC did, as shown in Table VI
But counter to the Navy results, the HASC exceeded the SASC
in the "Funding/Cost" category while the SASC exceeded the
HASC in the "Program Management" category. For the Air
Force, there was not a significant difference between the
two committees in the "Force Structure" category.
Using the micromanagement definition described earlier,
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From Figure 3 it appears that a significantly higher
percentage of the questions asked of the Air Force by the
SASC TACAIR Subcommittee fit the working definition of
micromanagement . However, in the case of the HASC, there
is little distinction between the questions asked of the
Navy and those of the Air Force.
It should be noted here that it was originally antici-
pated that there would be substantial differences in the
results obtained for the two committees -- differences asso-
ciated more with the structure of the committees than with
the influence of the particular service. This was expected
largely because the questions taken from the SASC Hearings
were generated by a separate subcommittee for Tactical Avia-
tion, whereas the HASC does not have a directly comparable,
separate subcommittee and the questions selected for analysis
were generated by the full HASC. This structural difference
results in a number of factors that have the potential for
influencing the results obtained. These factors include:
(1) the size, composition and expertise of the
staffs
(2) the position of the committee within the
approval chain
(3) the interests, concerns and primary responsi-
bilities of the committee members
While these factors are certainly real and undoubtedly
had some influence on the results obtained in this study,
the data indicate that the service in question was also a
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major contributing factor. As can be seen from Figure 3,
if the results obtained for the services are averaged
together for each committee, there ends up being very little
difference between the two committees. In fact, the greatest
differences in the percentage of micromanagement questions
asked occur not from committee to committee for a given
service, but rather between the Navy and the Air Force for
questions asked by one committee — the SASC. Thus, the
influences from the different structures of the two committees
were not as strong as originally anticipated.
B. FUNDING ADJUSTMENTS
Adjustments to the DoD budget request, as recommended
by the HASC and SASC, provided the second indicator measured
in this study. As discussed in Chapter III, these funding
adjustments were researched and the data recorded by:
(1) service, (2) committee making the recommendation,
(3) budget category and (4) by fiscal year. In addition, the
recommended adjustments themselves were measured in two
different ways — i.e., as a net change to the budget
request and as an absolute change.
The recording of the data in terms of these several varia-
bles allows for presentation of the findings in numerous ways
depending upon one's objectives. Since the purpose of this
study was to compare the Congressional treatment of Naval
Aviation programs with similar Air Force programs, the
findings summarized in the following sections will emphasize
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this area. The first section will directly compare Navy
and Air Force programs using both the NET CHANGES and
ABSOLUTE CHANGES measures. The second section will inves-
tigate the influence of the committee making the recommenda-
tion on both the Navy and Air Force budgets, but will only
use the ABSOLUTE CHANGE measure. Appendix E contains all
of the data collected in tabular form and would allow for
detailed analyses in terms of all the variables mentioned.
1. Comparison of Navy and Air Force Programs
a. NET CHANGE to the Budget Request
Calculations of the NET CHANGES to DoD ' s budget
request, as recommended by the authorization committees,
revealed significant differences between the treatment
accorded the Navy and Air Force budgets. Again, the NET
CHANGE to the budget request equals the algebraic total of
all increaes and decreases recommended by the committee.
It represents the level of funding the committees thought
most appropriate for the service to accomplish its tasks.
Figure 4 below shows the NET CHANGES recommended by the SASC
for FY's 1978, 1979 and 1980.
As is evident from Figure 4, in all three fiscal
years the SASC recommended a greater percentage NET CHANGE
in the Navy's budget than they did for the Air Force. In
FY 1978, reductions in both service's budgets were recommended,
whereas, in FY's 1979 and 1980, increases were recommended.
The greatest NET CHANGE recommended by the SASC was for the






























Figure 5 below provides the same information for the






























In FY's 1979 and 1980, the pattern developed in
Figure 4 for the SASC also holds for the changes recommended
by the HASC -- i.e., budget increases are recommended for both
the Navy and Air Force, the Navy's budget is subjected to a
greater percentage NET CHANGE and in FY 1980, the HASC
recommneded the greatest increase to the Navy's budget. How-
ever, FY 1978 presents a somewhat different picture — a
reduction is recommended for the Navy while an increase is
recommended for the Air Force. Further, the percent NET
CHANGE in the Navy's budget is less than that for the Air
Force — the first time this has occurred.
In order to concentrate even more on the comparison
between the treatment of Naval Aviation and tactical Air
Force programs, these NET CHANGES findings were taken one
step further. The NET CHANGES claculated for the SASC and
HASC and reported here in Figures 4 and 5 were averaged for
both the Navy and Air Force and the results are shown below
in Figure 6. This average value of the SASC and HASC
recommended changes is labeled "CONGRESSIONAL NET CHANGE,"
which is considered to be a reasonable representation based
upon the compromising activity (averaging out of extreme






























By averaging together the NET CHANGES recommended by
the SASC and HASC, it becomes clear that in all three years
investigated, the recommendation for the Navy is further
(increased or decreased) from its original request than the
recommendation for the Air Force. This is especially true
in FY 1980, where a 12.6% average CONGRESSIONAL NET CHANGE
(Increase) was recommended for the Navy. In all cases, the
change recommended for the Air Force was less than 2% of
its original request.
b. ABSOLUTE CHANGE to the Budget Request
The ABSOLUTE CHANGES recommended by the
authorizing committees will be presented in this section.
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The ABSOLUTE CHANGE equals the sum total of all changes
recommended without regard to whether these changes were
increases or decreases to the requested budget. It is a
better representation of total Congressional interest or
activity in establishing the budget.
Figure 7 below shows the ABSOLUTE CHANGES
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In each fiscal year, the SASC recommended a
greater percentage ABSOLUTE CHANGE in the Navy ' s budget than
they did in the Air Force's budget. The greatest change,
as well as the greatest difference between the changes
recommended for the services, occurred in FY 198 0.



























As was the case with the NET CHANGES in Figures
4 and 5, the pattern with the SASC recommended ABSOLUTE
CHANGES holds true for the HASC recommended ABSOLUTE CHANGES
in FY's 1979 and 1980. Greater percentage changes are
recommended for the Navy's budget. In fact, the greatest
recommended change occurs in FY 198 0. However, the situa-
tion is reversed in FY 1978. As was the case with the
NET CHANGES, in FY 1978 the HASC recommended a much larger
percentage change to the Air Force's budget than they did
to the Navy ' s budget
.
As was done in the previous section, where the
NET CHANGES were reported, an average of the SASC and HASC
recommended ABSOLUTE CHANGES will be presented in the follow-
ing figure. Although this average value has somewhat less
validity here than it did with the NET CHANGES, it still
provides a reasonable representation of CONGRESSIONAL ABSO-
LUTE CHANGE from the authorization committees.
Again, the CONGRESSIONAL ABSOLUTE CHANGE was
greatest for the Naval Aviation budgets in FY's 197 9 and
FY 1980 — particularly in FY 1980 when the absolute changes
recommended to the Navy's budget averaged 17% of the original
request and the changes to the Air Force's budget averaged
less than 6% of the original request. This result was re-
versed in FY 1973 when changes to the Air Force's budget
exceeded those recommended to the Navy's budget. However,
I
the difference between the two services was much less in
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Figure 9
2. Influence of the Committee
Although the primary purpose of this study was to
determine the differences between Congressional treatment of
Naval Aviation programs and similar Air Force programs, the
manner in which the data was recorded allowed for a compari-
son of the treatment accorded Naval Avaiation programs by
| the two authorizing committees — the SASC and HASC. Like-
wise, the changes to the Air Force's budget recommended by
60

the two committees could be compared. These comparisons for
the ABSOLUTE CHANGES measure are provided in Figures 10 and
11 to follow.
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As has been notice previously, the greatest percen-
tage changes to the Navy's budget were recommended by both
committees in FY 1980 with FY 1979 close behind. In both
years, the HASC recommended signficantly greater ABSOLUTE
CHANGES than the SASC did. This situation was reversed
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in FY 1978, when both committees recommended smaller
changes, but the larger of the two was recommended by the
SASC rather than the HASC .
























For the Air Force's budget, in all three fiscal
years, the HASC recommended the greater (or at least equal)
ABSOLUTE CHANGES, with the greatest change occurring in
FY 1978. FY 1978 was the year that the least change was
recommended by the HASC for the Navy's budget.
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Similar analyses could also be made of the NET
CHANGES recommended by the committees. In addition, the
differences between the budget categories (Procurement and
RDT&E) could be analyzed. However, differences attributa-
ble to these variables are of secondary interest to the
main concern of this study and thus are left to some other
researcher to investigate.
'
C. REASONS GIVEN FOR COMMITTEE DECISIONS
The third key indicator of Congressional behavior
investigated in this study focused on the published rationale
for the funding adjustment decisions recommended by the
authorization committees during the budget process. As des-
cribed in Chapter III, the variable actually measured was
the "fiscal/programmatic" theme that was determined to form
the basis of the committee recommendation. The data was
recorded by: (1) service, (2) committee (3) budget category
and (4) by fiscal year. Again, since the main thrust of
this study was to investigate the differences between Con-
gressional behavior toward Naval Aviation programs and
similar Air Force programs, the findings reported here will
emphasize this comparison. The first section to follow will
therefore, compare the results obtained for each service by
taking the HASC and SASC decisions together and also by
combining the budget categories — Procurement and RDT&E.
The second section will then consider the influence of the
committee making the recommendation. All of the data collected
in this area is attached in Appendix F in summary form.
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Those decisions placed in the "Other" category during
the analysis, i.e., no particular reason could be determined
for the decision, have been omitted from these findings for
purposes of simplicity. Less than 5% of the total decisions
were placed in this category and this was considered insigni-
ficant. It is for this reason, however, that some of the
findings in the following pages do not total 100%.
1 . Comparison of Navy and Air Force Programs
Figures 12 and 13 provide the results obtained for
the Navy and Air Force programs for the three fiscal year
budgets evaluated — FY 1978, FY 1979 and FY 1980.







































In each year, the HASC and SASC taken together made
more of their funding adjustment decisions on the Navy's
budget from a programmatic standpoint than for fiscal
reasons — i.e., the committees, while still concerned with
controlling the level of spending, were even more interested
in shaping the composition of Naval Aviation programs.
Programmatic activity was most prevalent on the FY 198
budget and least noticeable in 1979.
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Again in all three years, it appears that the
authorizing committees made more of their budget decisions
for Air Force Tactical programs on a programmatic basis
rather than from a strictly fiscal concern. This was
especially true in FY 1979. Figure 14 below provides a
more direct comparison of the treatment of Navy and Air
Force programs by counting only the programmatic decisions
for the two services.




















Figure 14 shows that in all three years investigated,
the authorization committee's decision-making was more pro-
grammatic for the Air Force's budget than for comparable Naval
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Aviation programs. However, this difference was only very
significant in FY 1979. In FY 1978 and FY 1980, the
committee's treatment of the Navy and Air Force budgets
was remarkably similar.
2. Influence of the Committees
Attention will now be drawn to the differences in
decision making behavior between the two committees of con-
cern here — the SASC and the HASC. As in the previous
figure, the figure to follow will show the percentage of
total decisions that were evaluated as programmatic for the
two committees. In addition, the data collected for all
three fiscal year budgets will be combined together. It
was thought that there were an insufficient number of deci-
sions in each committee to have significance if each fiscal
year was considered separately. However, taken together,
the results displayed below are considered valid enough to
at least suggest the "fiscal/programmatic" tendencies of
a committee.
The committees were- remarkably consistent in making
approximately 57% of their decisions on a programmatic
basis for both services with one exception — over 75% of
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This chapter will initially present a brief review of
the most significant results obtained for each of the
three key indicators of Congressional behavior that formed
the basis for this study. This review is summarized from
the findings presented in Chapter IV. Using these results,
conclusions of a more general nature, comparing Congressional
treatment of Naval Aviation programs and Tactical Air Force
programs, will then be offered.
A. REVIEW OF THE KEY INDICATORS MEASURED
1. Hearing Questions
a. Subject Matter
The majority of the questions asked both services
were in the Design/Performance and Program Management cate-
gories. The Air Force was asked more questions related to
Funding/Cost and the Navy was asked more questions pertaining
to Force Structure.
b. Micromanagement
In both years, the Air Force was subjected to a
higher percentage of questions classified as micromanagement.
This was particularly true in FY 197 9 when over 1/3 of the
questions asked of the Air Force were considered to reflect





No clear relationship was established for the
subject matter of the questions asked by the two committees.
However, there was a distinction between the two committees
relative to their tendencies toward micromanagement -- the
SASC was significantly more micromanagement oriented toward
the Air Force than the Navy, whereas, the reverse was true
for the HASC.
2 . Funding Adjustments
a. Net Changes
In all three years, the average Congressional
net budget change was greater for the Navy than it was for
the Air Force. In FY 78, this net change resulted in a bud-
get decrease for the Navy, but in FY's 7 9 and 80, there was
a budget increase . In all years, there was a budget increase
recommended for the Air Force, but the change from the
originally requested amount was much less than the Navy's
change.
b. Absolute Changes
In FY 79 and FY 80, the average Congressional
absolute budget change was significantly greater for the
Navy than it was for the Air Force. This was reversed in
FY 78, although the difference between the services was much
less than in the following two years.
c. Committee Influence
The HASC recommended significantly greater abso-
lute changes in the Navy's budget in FY 7 9 and FY 8 than
70

the SASC did. In FY 78, the SASC recommended a slightly-
greater change than the HASC. In all three fiscal years,
the HASC recommended absolute changes to the Air Force's
budget that were equal to or greater than the changes
recommended by the SASC.
3 . Reasons Given for Committee Decisions
a. Fiscal/Programmatic Decisions
In all three years, more of the decisions on
the Air Force's budgets were made from a programmatic
standpoint than the decisions on the Navy's budget. For
both the Navy and the Air Force, however, the majority of
the decisions were programmatic.
b. Committee Influence
The SASC made significantly more programmatic
decisions for the Air Force than they did for the Navy.
The HASC treated both services about the same — approximately
57% of their decisions were programmatic.
B. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
In taking an overall perspective of the literature
researched and the results obtained in this study and in
attempting to provide an interpretation that holds some
general benefit for future students of this area, one fact
stands out very clearly — Congressional decision-making is
a very complex process. There are few, if any, rules or
models that reliably predict how Congress will behave in
given situations. Its environment is so full of influences —
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its interrelations with the participating institutions so
complicated — that, at times, it seems a useless exercise
to try to predict Congressional behavior. Nevertheless,
some agencies, such as DoD, whose budgets require annual
Congressional authorization have so much at stake in their
interactions with Congress that they must make every attempt
to gain some insight into the decision-making processes.
They literally cannot afford a course of action other than
to continually pursue any possible clue to how decisions
are made. It is in this light that the following general
conclusions are offered.
During the authorization Hearings investigated here,
Congress tended to ask the Air Force more questions of a
micromanagement nature than they did the Navy. Also, a
larger percentage of the reasons given for committee deci-
sions were programmatic for the Air Force's budget than they
were for the Navy. It is not suggested that these two indi-
cators are measures of the same behavior. However, upon
reflection, it is not considered surprising that the results
obtained for the two are closely related. An inclination
toward programmatic decisions would indicate a Congressional
desire to play a part in the policy-making and to help shape
the composition of the weapon system programs. Micromanage-
ment, as defined here, is reflected by highly detailed Con-
gressional questions in the Design/Performance and Program
Management subject areas. It would seem to follow quite
logically then, that if for some reason, the Congress felt
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the need to micromanage the Air Force to a greater extent
during the Hearings, that they would also subsequently make
more programmatic decisions on the Air Force's budget. This
is, of course, what the results of this limited study
indicate.
Further investigation of the possibility of a working
relationship between these two variables is not warranted
since they were not designed with this purpose in mind and
as a result, have very definite areas of overlap. For exam-
ple, all questions in the Force Structure subject category
were classified as non-micromanagement , while budgetary
decisions citing concerns with the services' force composi-
tion were categorized as programmatic decisions.
It is interesting to note at this point that in recent
years, critics of the Congressional role in the defense
budget process have often urged that Congress reassert
itself and assume its Constitutionally mandated role as
"keeper of the purse." Various students of the Congressional
process have taken programmatic decision-making as a measure
of Congress's assertion of power and have noted the increase
of programmatic behavior in recent years [Refs. 3, 4, 16
and 20] . The results of this study indicate that this inclina-
tion toward programmatic decision-making has continued into
the FY 1980 budget process. The data also suggest that
Congressional micormanagement has been increasing as the
programmatic decision-making behavior has been increasing.
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So, while some laud the trend toward Congressional assump-
tion of its rightful role in the budgetary process and call
it programmatic decision-making, others, especially within
DoD, are pleading for relief from increasing Congressional
micromanagement
.
This set of circumstances brings to light the dilemma
surrounding the issue of micromanagement. On the one hand,
Congress has been given major responsibilities and power by
the Constitution as "keeper of the purse." To fulfill this
responsibility, Congress must control spending, which in
turn implies the formulation of substantive policy. However,
given the size and complexity of the DoD budgets and the
limited time and resources available for review, it is
extremely difficult for Congress to make responsible, major
policy decisions. It is far easier and indeed, more rational
for Congress to concentrate on budget and program details.
This approach does, in fact, allow Congress to work toward
fulfilling its budgetary responsibilities since these details
do, in the end, affect policy. Herein lies the dilemma —
Congress is increasingly being accused of micromanagement
although this attention to detail may be the only rational
approach they can follow to fulfill their Constitutional
responsibilities
.
This dilemma is certainly not a short term problem since
j
its origins lie in the very design of our governmental
system. As discussed in the introductory chapter to this
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study, Richard Neustadt's "government of separated institutions
sharing powers" results in a system of constant competition
between the Executive and Congress. While this study provided
little information to aid in the solution of this dilemma, it
did demonstrate the very real nature of the problem and revealed
its impact on the defense budget process.
While the results obtained here show that the Air Force
has been subjected to more micromanagement than the Navy and
that more of the decisions made on its budget were of a pro-
grammatic nature, the question of how the budget level has
actually been changed remains to be discussed. As summarized
previously, by all measures of funding change, the budget
finally recommended for the Navy varied more from the original
request than the Air Force budget did. The largest variations
occurred in FY 79 and FY 80 when substantial budget increases
were recommended for the Navy. The net budget increase recom-
mended for the Navy in FY 79 was 4.3% and in FY 80 it was 12.6%
of the original request. The comparable changes recommended
to the Air Force's budgets were .8% and 1.2%. Similar results
were obtained with the absolute change measure.
The reasons behind these results are, of course, unknown.
Possibly the committees' interests in examining more details
in the Air Force's budget generated confidence that the
original request did not require changes of the same magni-
tude as the Navy. Perhaps, the Navy's funding requirements
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were just greater during this timeframe. This would cer-
tainly correspond to the major controversy surrounding
Naval Aviation's future mission and force structure. The
debates within DoD and between DoD and Congress over such
issues as the number and mix of aircraft required in the
Fleet and the conventional aircraft versus V/STOL aircraft
question have certainly contributed to the recommendations
for substantial changes to the Navy's budget.
A final possible explanation for the larger changes in
the Navy's budget centers on the suggestion by Laurance
[Ref. 18, p. 227] and others that Congress becomes most
involved in those issues that are being disputed within
DoD. In reviewing the programs within the Navy's budget
that were subjected to the largest changes, it became apparent
that this phenomenon was indeed taking place here. Time
after time, the programs most affected were those that had
been subjected to the most intense debate during the DoD
budget preparation cycle. It was often revealed in the
Hearings testimony that the Navy's budget requests had been
significantly altered during the DoD review process. The
committee's subsequent budget decisions reflected a tendency
to agree with the Navy's program recommendations over the
DoD recommended program contained in the President's budget
and to restore funding to the levels originally requested
by the Navy.
Whatever the reasons are, it appears that adjustments to
the budget were being recommended by the committee with the
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intention of shaping the composition of the Naval Aviation
Force. This Congressional interest in the Navy force
structure is further borne out by the following:
1) Although even more programmatic decisions were
made on the Air Force's budget than on the Navy's,
still a majority of the Navy's decisions were also
programmatic
.
2) A much larger percentage of the questions asked of
the Navy during the authorization Hearings were
concerned with force structure - 16% for the Navy
versus 4% for the Air Force.
Thus, from an overall standpoint, it would seem that
the climate during the Congressional authorization process
is generally favorable for Naval Aviation programs. This
is especially true when compared to their primary competitor
for funds, the Air Force's Tactical Aviation programs.
The Air Force programs are subjected to more micromanagement
questioning during the Hearings and a larger percentage of
the committee decisions made on their budget reflect a pro-
grammatic orientation. Questioning of the Navy during the
Hearings has less of a micromanagement tone and is concentrated
more in the area of force structure. Committee decision-
making is programmatic for the Navy, but not to the same degree
that it is for the Air Force. However, the most important
indicator of the Congressional climate, i.e., the actual




List of sample questions asked during the Authorization
Hearings in the Program Management subject category. These
|
questions are arranged in order of increasing "level of
detail."
Why are these being provided CFE at this stage
of this program instead of GFE?
It appears that the fact that the Air Force is
not competing and providing GFE the warhead and
the actuator is different than it is on most of
the other missile programs. Apparently the
Government feels it can save money on the other
missile programs by providing these subsystems
GFE. Can you explain why not on the Maverick?
And does the prime have a data package that
would allow him to compete those?
The GAO recommended that DoD expedite modifica-
tion of existing antiradiation missiles to improve
their capabilities. Do you have an answer to
that suggestion?
Are you also going to get a second source
into the design program?
When you restart the Maverick production will
you have competition for the rocket motor, the
warhead, and the hydraulic control system?
What do the contract guarantees provide for?
How much of this missile does McDonnell Douglas
actually make in their plant? They are the prime and




What are you saying is you really wanted it;
you determined you couldn't afford it within
budget constraints?
It has been rumored, but no confirmation has
been made by officials in OSD that the A-7E's are
going out of the 1978 budget. Is that or is it
not a fact?
Admiral, has the Secretary of Defense reached
a decision in connection with the DSARC?
In view of the laser seeker development prob-
lems, does the Office of the Secretary of Defense
plan to review the program under the DSARC process
prior to the beginning of production?
etc,
So you will be buying more spares to get it up
to 70 percent?
Why were engine spares increased over last
year's planning?
I had the impression the support equipment was
mobile enough to take it off of a carrier that went
in for overhaul and then put it onto another one
which was going to be deployed.
And you reduce the requirement on board ship
for all of the spares for those two aircraft. They




What were the reasons for the two holds in the
operational testing last year?
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Will planned tests show the degree to which the
various Maverick seekers are operationally effective
in a close air support, anti-tank role and when
will this information be made available to Congress?
The Air Force announced late last year its
intentions to extend A-10 fatigue testing beyond
two lifetimes. What is the status of these tests?
etc.
/
What is the status of the TF-30 engine program?
What is the SDLM repair program? Would you
describe it?
Then you could pick up if this Congress approves
the PEP program. Where will you be able to pick up
the airplanes in the line?
Would you describe the Phoenix improvement pro-
gram, tell us how long that development will take
and how much it is going to cost for R&D?
)
etc
Once you go beyond, you have to start doubling
lines and do other things so the costs rise again.
Thirty-eight would be the optimum rate?
What is the production rate per month now?
So, what we are talking about is slowing down the
purchase of this airplane which will cost us $8 61





Do you have any production problems at this
time in the program?
How does the FY 78 buy relate to the overall
procurement schedule for the F-14A?
If the attrition buy was to be stretched out
in order to keep a hot production base, at what
point in your program would the stretchout start?
etc
What is the current outlook for foreign sales
for the F-15?
Now, how will that production be impacted if
that letter of offer is negotiated?
What opportunities exist for tri-service stan-
dardization of missiles, seekers, designators and
target acquisition aids?
So apparently there is quite a cost penalty in
having these tri-service requirements?
etc
.
Would you describe the history of the develop-
ment and procurement of the avionics intermediate
ship and tell us what are the lessons learned by
the Air Force to be applied to future programs?
Is it fair to say that the reason you had all
these problems in the early points is because of
the crash program for the development of the F-14
and the amount of concurrency?
>
etc.
Why didn't Air Force officials advise the committees
in March 1976 of the technical difficulties being experi-
enced with development of the Maverick seeker?
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I am just wondering how you can take F-15 money
that was authorized and appropriated by Congress
and put it into some other little kitty like that,
if that is what this statement implies?
Where would Congress have an opportunity to
either accept it or reject it?
The Congress provided the $15 million in fiscal
1977 to do the work in upgrading the engine, and





Development of the Typology for analyzing the questions
asked during the Authorization Hearings by identifying the
"levels of detail" and by generating corresponding "typical
questions" for each subject category.
Cost/Funding Category
Level I - How will the program cost be impacted by
changes in the type of procurement, the
design or the schedule?
Level II - How much will this particular portion of
the program cost?
Level III - What is the unit cost (flyaway, program
unit, etc.) of this system?
Level IV - What does this system cost compared to
others? Is this system cost effective?
Level V - How do you track and control costs?
Level VI - What is this program's financial status?
Level VII - What are the implications for total force
or mission area financing?
Force Structure Category
Level I - What is the inventory of this particular
system?
Level II - How does this inventory compare with your
outfitting or operational plans and schedules?
Level III - What mix of systems is required to meet
your force needs?
Design/Performance Category
Level I - Why is this system designed in this manner?
Wouldn't it be better to be this other way?
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Level II - How fast (how far, how high, etc.) does
this system operate? What is this particu-
lar design characteristic/design problem?
Level III - How is this system employed operationally?
Level IV - What overall performance or operational
success do you expect to achieve? What
is the life of the system? Which systems
are compatible with each other?
Level V - How does the performance of this system com-





How is this program being managed? Will
you have competition? What type of con-
tract will you have? Why are these items
being procured as CFE instead of GFE?
Will you have a DSARC decision? Have the
requirements of OMB Circular A-109 been
satisfied?
Level III - Have you made adequate plans for supporting
the system?
Level IV - What are the specific results of this test
program? What do these results mean?
Level V - What is the status of this particular seg-
ment of the program?
Level VI - What is the optimum production rate for
this system?
Level VII - What is the production schedule/program
status? Do you have any production problems?
Level VIII - What is the impact of FMS on this program?
What is the relationship between this
program and other DoD programs?
Level IX - What management problems exist in the
overall force? What lessons have been learned?
Level X - Why wasn't the Congressional direction
complied with? Why were the technical
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Sample Worksheets Used For Recording Committee Decisions And
?or Categorizing These Decisions As Programmatic, Fiscal or
)ther.
KEY TO CATEGORY ABBREVIATIONS
? - Programmatic F - Fiscal - Other
FS/E - Force Structure/ CT - Cost
Effectiveness IR - Improper Request
FM - Force Modernization PM - Program Management
DEV - Development
P/J - Planning/Justification
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Compilation of all results obtained from analyzing the adjustments
to the Navy's and Air Force's budget requests as recommended by
the HASC and SASC
.
Changes to the Navy's PROCUREMENT Budget Request
($ in Thousands)
FY 1978 FY 1979 FY 1980
Budget Request $3,993,900 $4,444,800 $4,390,300
NET Changes
-HASC -$3,800 +$476,080 +$702,104
-SASC -$181,900 +$84,700 +$391,600
ABSOLUTE Changes
-HASC $52,600 $714,280 $902,104
-SASC $374,700 $409,700 $489,200
Changes to the Air Force's PROCUREMENT Budget Request
($ in Thousands)
FY 1978 FY 1979 FY 1980
Budget Request $6,613,900 $7,206,300 $8,190,900
NET Changes
-HASC +$672,400 +$159,700 +$135,190
-SASC -$40,000 +$64,500 +$93,400
'ABSOLUTE Changes
-HASC $796,800 $482,300 $499,190
-SASC $52,100 $479,700 $393,000
90

Changes to the Navy's R,D,T&E Budget Request
($ In Thousands)
FY 1978 FY 1979 FY 1980
Budget Request $1,050,050 $1,331,953 $1,130,246
NET Changes
-HASC -$100,410 -$170,609 +$129,760
-SASC -$3,740 +$81,690 $162,786
ABSOLUTE Changes
-HASC $152,410 $254,009 $268,240
-SASC $3,740 $162,110 $207,214
Changes to the Air Force's R,D,T&E Budget Request
($ In Thousands)
FY 1978 FY 1979 FY 1980
Budget Request $948,300 $1,120,700 $1,135,544
NET Changes





-HASC $343,800 $83,100 $138,400








































































































































































































































ON O in vo r-i m m CO o>












HH 0) w 4 ^i
< El =8 <3 Eh Eh 3 Eh fr a
o -. O o •> O S
O Q Eh Q Eh «s
Jh 1 PQ U •> cq cc
cu DC P CU « p 53











"Behind the Tug of War Over Defense Spending," U.S
.
News and World Report
, pp. 22-25, August 28, 1978.
Berry, Robert C. and Peckham, Danial E., Interactions of
Navy Program Managers with Congressional Committees and
Their Staffs , Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate
School, March 1975.
3. Blackmon, Larry W. , An Application of Content Analysis
to the Budgetary Behavior of the Senate Armed Services
Committee , Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School,
March 1975.
4. Camp, Robert Thomas, An Application of Content Analysis
to Determine Congressional Behavior in Relation to the
Defense Budget , Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate
School, June 1977.
5. "Congress Gets a Grip on Defense Strategy," Business
Week
,
p. 38, August 28, 1978.
6
.
Congressional Decision Making For National Security
,
Committee for Economic Development, New York, New
York, September 1974.
7. Dawson, John E. , "Origins of the Federal Budget Process:
The Challenge of Particularism and Synthesis," Armed
Forces Comptroller , v. 39, p. 2, April 1975.
8. Fenno, Richard, F. , Jr., Congressmen in Committees ,
Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1973.
9. Fenno, Richard, F., Jr., The Power of the Purse , Little,
Brown and Company, Boston, 196 6. -
Frye, Alton, A Responsible Congress: The Politics of
National Security , McGraw-Hill, 1975.
"Great Congressional Power Grab," Business Week , pp. 90-
99, September 11, 1978.
Havemann, Joel, Congress and The Budget , Indiana Univer-
sity Press, Bloomington, 1978.
Henning, Peter John, Navy-Congressional Interactions and
the Response to Mission Budgeting , Master's Thesis, Naval
Postgraduate School, March 1977.
94

Huntington, Samuel P., The Common Defense
, Columbia
University Press, 1961.
Ichord, Richard H. , U.S. Congressman, "Micromanagement
:
The Congressional Perspective," Armed Forces Journal
International
, pp. 20-26, October 1977.
Kanter, Arnold, "Congress and the Defense Budget:
1960-1970," The American Political Science Review
,
Vol. 66, pp. 129-143, March 1972.
Korb, Lawrence J., "Congressional Impact on Defense
Spending, 1962-1973: The Programmatic and Fiscal
Hypothesis," Naval War College Review
,
Vol. XXVI, No. 3,
pp. 49-61, November-Dec ember 1973.
Laurance, Edward J., "The Changing Role of Congress in
Defense Policy-Making , " Journal of Conflict Resolution
,
Vol. 20, No. 2, p. 213-253, June 1976.
Levens, LuAnne K. and Schemmer, Benjamin F. , "I Make
Waves... in the Pentagon Pool," Armed Forces Journal
International
, pp. 22-26, December 1973.
Lukenas, Leo A., An Analysis of the Budgetary Behavior
of the House Appropriations Committee on Defense Pro-
curement , Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School,
June 1974.
Maury, John M. , "Can Congress Run the Defense Department,"
Armed Forces Journal International
, pp. 3 0-32, November
1976.
22. Naval War College, Center for Advanced Research Report,
Providing Defense Information to Congress: Potential
Improvements to a Growing Problem^ by L . R . Cabe, p~. 6
,
May 1977.
23. Power of the Pentagon: The Creation, Control and
Acceptance of Defense Policy by the U.S. Congress ,
Congressional Quarterly Inc., Washington, D .C. , T97 2.
24. Schemmer, Benjamin F., "Congress" Micromanagement
Handcuffs DoD," Armed Forces Journal International ,
pp. 8-29, July 1977.
25. Schlesinger, Arthur M. , Jr. and de Grazia, Alfred,
Congress and the Presidency: Their Role in Modern Times ,




26. Sharkansky, Ira, "An Appropriations Subcommittee and
its Client Agencies: A Comparative Study of Supervision
and Control," The American Political Science Review
,
Vol. 59, No. 3, pp. 622-628, September 1965.
27. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed
Services, Hearings on Military Posture and Department
of Defense Authorization for Appropriations, FY 1978
,
Part 2 of 6 Parts, 95th Congress, 1st Session, H.A.S.C.
Report No. 9 5-4.
28. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed
Services, Hearings on Military Posture and Department
of Defense Authorization for Appropriations, FY 1979
,
Part 2 of 7 Parts, 95th Congress, 2nd Session, H.A.S.C.
Report No. 95-56.
29. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed
Services, Report on Department of Defense Authorization
Act, FY 1978 , 95th Congress, 1st Session, Report No. 95-194
30. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed
Services, Report on Department of Defense Authorization
Act, FY 197 9 , 9 5th Congress, 2nd Session, Report No.
95-1118.
31. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed
Services , Report on Department of Defense Authorization
Act, FY 1980 , 96th Congress, 1st Session, Report No.
96-166.
32. U.S. House of Representatives, The Constitution of the
United States of America , 95th Congress, 1st Session,
House Document No. 9 5-256.
33. U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on
FY 1978 Authorization for Military Procurement, Research
and Development, and Active Duty, etc. , Parts 6 and 7,
Tactical Air, 95th Congress, 1st Session.
34. U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on
Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations
for FY 1979 , Parts 6 and 7, Tactical Air, 95th Congress,
2nd Session.
35. U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Report
Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1978 for
Military Procurement, Research and Development, Active




U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Report
Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979 for
Military Procurement, Research and Development, Active
Duty, etc. , 95th Congress, 2nd Session, Report No.
95-826.
U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Report
Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980 for
Military Procurement, Research and Development, Active
Duty, etc. , 96th Congress, 1st Session, Report No.
96-197.
U.S. Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Hearings
Before the Subdommittee on Budgeting, Management, and
Expenditures, Improving Congressional Control of the
Budget , 93rd Congress , 1st Session, Parts 1 and 2
.
U.S. Senate, Committee on Government Operations,
Subcommittee on Oversight Procedures, Committee Print,
Congressional Oversight, Methods and Techniques
,
94th Congress, 2nd Session, July 1976.
U.S. Senate, Hearings Before the Committee on the Budget,
Can Congress Control the Power of the Purse? , 95th
Congress, 2nd Session, March 6, 1978.
Wildavsky, Aaron, The Politics of the Budgetary Process
,
Little, Borwn and Company, Second Edition, 1974.
"Will the 96th Become the 'Oversight Congress'?,"
National Journal
, pp. 44-49, January 13, 1979.
Wood, Stephen C. , Modelling Congressional Decision
Making for Defense Spending , Master's Thesis, Naval





Defense Documentation Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
Library, Code 0142 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
Department Chairman, Code 54 1
Department of Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
Professor Edward J. Laurance, Code 56Lk 10
Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
Professor J.W. Creighton, Code 54Cf 1
Department of Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
Edward G. Ingalls 1
2930 Fairlee Drive
Fairfax, Virginia 22031
Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange 1
U.S. Army Logistics Management Center













5 JUL r -c
3068U
-309!*2









Congressional climate for naval aviation
3 2768 002 10162 8
DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
